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Hardware-Layer Intelligence Collection for Smart Grid Embedded Systems

  • Charalambos KonstantinouEmail author
  • Michail Maniatakos
Article
  • 9 Downloads

Abstract

Smart grids include a variety of microprocessor-based embedded systems, interconnected with communication technologies. In this interaction, hardware is the lower level of abstraction. Insecure and unprotected hardware design of smart grid devices enable system operation compromise, eventually leading to undesirable and often severe consequences. In this paper, we discuss how the hardware of grid equipment can be used to collect intelligence utilized towards beneficial or malicious purposes. We consider different access scenarios and attacker capabilities as well as equipment location in the grid. The outcome of “hardware hacking” is examined in both device and grid operation levels. Finally, we present hardware hardening techniques, aiming to make components attack-resistant and reduce their vulnerability surface.

Keywords

Security Hardware Embedded systems Intelligence Smart grid 

Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, Center for Advanced Power SystemsFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA
  2. 2.Center for Cyber SecurityNew York University Abu DhabiAbu DhabiUAE

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