Journal of Quantitative Economics

, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp 699–705 | Cite as

Patent Protection and R&D Incentives Under Incomplete Information

  • Srobonti ChattopadhyayEmail author
  • Rittwik Chatterjee
Notes and Short Article


When tournament effect is negative, under complete information, whether patent protection increases the incentive for R&D is ambiguous. It depends on the extent of spillover of the new technology. In particular if that amount is less than a threshold value then patent protection increases the incentive for R&D, otherwise it does not. This note considers incomplete information framework where the spillover parameter is private information. In this framework it is shown that there are situations where patent protection unambiguously increases incentive for R&D. This happens if the distribution function of the spillover parameter is sufficiently skewed and the cost of doing research is sufficiently high even when tournament effect is negative.


R&D incentives Cournot duopoly Spillovers Incomplete information Patent protection Tournament effect 

JEL Classification

D43 D82 L13 O31 



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Copyright information

© The Indian Econometric Society 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Vidyasagar College for WomenUniversity of CalcuttaKolkataIndia
  2. 2.Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, CalcuttaKolkataIndia

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