Economia Politica

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 295–322 | Cite as

Rationing methods for allocating the European Union’s rural development funds in Poland

  • Vito FragnelliEmail author
  • Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska
Original Paper


In this paper, we evaluate the applicability of the bankruptcy and the relevance factors methods to the allocation of structural policy budgets using Polish Rural Development Program as a practical example. Our results demonstrate that the main problem with the bankruptcy approach used for policy budget allocation is that project claims are not directly related to project importance. Highly significant programs with small claims are potentially penalized by the proportional solution or by the Constrained Equal Losses solution, while projects of low importance and small claims may be fully funded using the Constrained Equal Awards solution. The relevance approach, on the other hand, is highly dependent on the measure computed using expert opinions. This measure is not influenced by claims. Thus, given reliable expert assessments, the relevance factors method appears advantageous to the bankruptcy approach. This method is also far superior to the less formal methods currently used by decision-makers.


Budget allocation Bankruptcy problem Relevance factor measures Common agricultural policy Rural development 

JEL Classification

C71 Cooperative Games Q18 Agricultural Policy 



The authors gratefully acknowledge two anonymous reviewers for their useful detailed comments that allowed us to improve the paper. This work was supported by the Polish National Science Center (Grant number 2013/11/B/HS4/00685).


  1. Bankes, S. C. (1992). Exploratory modeling and the use of simulation for Policy analysis. Paper RAND library collection No N-3093-A. Santa Monica: RAND Institute.Google Scholar
  2. Brams, S., & Taylor, A. D. (1994). Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions. Theory and Decision, 37, 211–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Casas-Mendez, B., Fragnelli, V., & Garcia-Jurado, I. (2011). Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 215, 161–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Curiel, I., Maschler, M., & Tijs, S. (1987). Bankruptcy games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 31, 143–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Daugbjerg, C. (2009). Sequencing in public policy: The evolution of the CAP over a decade. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(3), 395–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Fragnelli, V., Freixas, J., Pons, M., & Sanmiquel, L. (2016). Measuring the relevance of factors in the occurrences of events. Central European Journal Operations Research, 24, 535–561.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Hodge, I. (2003). Mainstreaming rural development policy under the CAP: An English perspective. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 5(4), 361–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hokari, T., & Thomson, W. (2003). Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule. Economic Theory, 21, 241–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Hougaard, J. L. (2009). An introduction to allocation rules. Berlin: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Hougaard, J. L., Moreno-Ternero, J., & Østerdal, L. P. (2012). A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 48, 107–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Hougaard, J. L., Moreno-Ternero, J., & Østerdal, L. P. (2013a). Rationing in the presence of baselines. Social Choice and Welfare, 40, 1047–1066.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hougaard, J. L., Moreno-Ternero, J., & Østerdal, L. P. (2013b). Rationing with baselines: The composition extension operator. Annals of Operations Research, 211, 179–191.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Jonsson, T. (2007). Collective action and common agricultural policy lobbying: Evidence of euro-group influence 1986–2003, Umea Economic Studies No. 713. Umea: Department of Economics, Umea University.Google Scholar
  14. Kirschke, D., & Jechlitschka, K. (2002). Angewandte Mikroökonomie und Wirtschaftspolitik mit Excel. München: Vahlen.Google Scholar
  15. Kirschke, D., & Jechlitschka, K. (2003). Interaktive Programmierungsansätze für die Gestaltung von Agrar- und Umweltprogrammen. Agrarwirtschaft, 52, 211–217.Google Scholar
  16. Kiryluk-Dryjska, E. (2014a). Fair division approach for the European Union’s structural policy budget allocation: An application study. Group Decision and Negotiations, 23, 597–615.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Kiryluk-Dryjska, E. (2014b). Formalizacja decyzji wyboru publicznego. Zastosowanie do alokacji środków strukturalnych Wspólnej Polityki Rolnej UE w Polsce. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.Google Scholar
  18. Moulin, H. (2000). Priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods. Econometrica, 68, 643–684.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Munda, G. (2004). Social multi-criteria evaluation. Methodological foundations and operational consequences. European Journal of Operational Research, 158, 662–677.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Nedergaard, P. (2006). Market failures and government failures: A theoretical model of common agricultural policy. Public Choice, 127, 385–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. O’Neill, B. (1982). A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2, 345–371.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Pulido, M., Sanchez-Soriano, J., & Llorca, N. (2002). Game theory techniques for university management: An extended bankruptcy model. Annals of Operations Research, 109, 129–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Rowiński, J. (2010). Wpływ funduszy współfinansowanych ze środków Unii Europejskiej na rozwój rolnictwa i regionów wiejskich (studium porównawcze). In J. Rowiński (Ed.), Wpływ funduszy współfinansowanych ze środków Unii Europejskiej na rozwój rolnictwa i regionów wiejskich. Warszawa: IERiGŻ.Google Scholar
  24. Schummer, J., & Thomson, W. (1997). The derivations of the uniform rule. Economics Letters, 55, 333–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Thomson, W. (2003). Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: A survey. Mathematical Social Sciences, 45, 249–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Thomson, W. (2015). Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update. Mathematical Social Sciences, 74, 41–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Walker, W. E. (2000). Policy analysis: A systematic approach to supporting policymaking in the public sector. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 9, 11–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Wegener, S., & Kiryluk, E. (2008). Regional aspects of decision-making support for rural development in Poland. In: 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists People, Food and Environment. Global Trends and European Strategies, Ghent University. Accessed 24 Aug 2017.
  29. Young, H. P. (1994a). Cost Allocation. In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of game theory with economic applications (pp. 1193–1235). Amsterdam: North Holland.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Young, H. P. (1994b). Equity in theory and practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Zawalińska, K. (2009). Instrumenty i efekty wsparcia Unii Europejskiej dla regionalnego rozwoju obszarów wiejskich w Polsce. Warszawa: IRWIiR.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Sciences and Technological InnovationUniversity of Eastern PiedmontAlessandriaItaly
  2. 2.Faculty of Economics and Social SciencesPoznań University of Life SciencesPoznanPoland

Personalised recommendations