Organs, embryos, and part-human chimeras: further applications of the social account of dignity
In their recent paper in this journal, Zümrüt Alpinar-Şencan and colleagues review existing dignity-based objections to organ markets and outline a new form of dignity-based objection they believe has more merit: one grounded in a social account of dignity. This commentary clarifies some aspects of the social account of dignity and then shows how this revised account can be applied to other perennial issues in bioethics, including the ethics of human embryo research and the ethics of creating part-human chimeras.
KeywordsHuman dignity Organ transplantation Commodification Embryo research Part-human chimeras
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