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Economic Theory Bulletin

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 271–276 | Cite as

Divide-and-choose with nonmonotonic preferences

  • Laurence KranichEmail author
Research Article
  • 27 Downloads

Abstract

I consider the divide-and-choose method for allocating fixed quantities of infinitely divisible commodities among two agents when their preferences are commonly known but need not be monotonic. First, I show that with single-dipped preferences, the outcome may not be envy-free (or efficient). Also, it may be advantageous to be the chooser rather than the divider. I then show that if preferences are single-peaked, the divide-and-choose outcome is envy-free. This establishes a significantly weaker sufficient condition for no-envy than monotonicity. Moreover, it shows that it is not the lack of monotonicity per se that may cause the divide-and-choose outcome to be envious but rather a particular type.

Keywords

Divide-and-choose Envy-free Divider’s advantage Nonmonotonic preferences Single-peaked Single-dipped 

JEL Classification

D63 

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Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity at AlbanyAlbanyUSA

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