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Economic Theory Bulletin

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 173–189 | Cite as

Discriminatory auctions with resale

  • Isa HafalirEmail author
  • Musab Kurnaz
Research Article

Abstract

We consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell items in the resale stage, the equilibrium in the auction without resale is no longer an equilibrium in an auction with resale. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, we show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units.

Keywords

Multi-unit auctions Resale Discriminatory auctions Reserve price 

JEL Classification

D44 C72 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are very grateful and deeply indebted to Vijay Krishna for his contributions to an earlier version of this paper. We also thank Christoph Mueller and Gabor Virag for valuable discussion and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

Supplementary material

40505_2018_152_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (211 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 210 KB)

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Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.UTS Business SchoolUniversity of Technology SydneyUltimoAustralia
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Belk College of BusinessUniversity of North Carolina at CharlotteCharlotteUSA
  3. 3.College of Administrative Science and EconomicsKoç University, Rumelifeneri YoluSarıyerTurkey

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