Intel and the Rebirth of the Economic Approach to EU Competition Law

  • Giuseppe ColangeloEmail author
  • Mariateresa Maggiolino


The Intel ruling will significantly affect EU competition law. It confirms that there cannot be per se violations of Art. 102 TFEU and that, once the Commission follows a specific test in assessing the anticompetitive nature of a unilateral conduct, the reviewing courts cannot overlook that test. In addition, Intel gives some hints as to the rules governing the burden and the standard of proof that should be applied to show that monopolistic behaviors are anticompetitive.


Antitrust Intel Effect-based approach As-efficient-competitor test 


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Copyright information

© Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Jean Monnet Professor of EU Innovation Policy, Associate Professor of Law and EconomicsUniversity of Basilicata and LUISS Guido CarliRomeItaly
  2. 2.Associate Professor of Business LawBocconi UniversityMilanItaly

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