Advertisement

Springer Nature is making Coronavirus research free. View research | View latest news | Sign up for updates

Mitigation of Frequency and Voltage Disruptions in Smart Grid During Cyber-Attack

  • 18 Accesses

Abstract

In this paper, impacts of cyber-attack on proportional integral derivative controlled automatic generation control unit and automatic voltage regulator have been analyzed individually. A controlled switching unit has been proposed for ensuring frequency stability during an attack. Also, another controlled switching unit, designed for automatic voltage regulator, has been proposed for mitigating voltage disruption during a cyber-attack. The protective model proposed in this paper offers combined protection for frequency and voltage disruptions in a power system during cyber-attack.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9
Fig. 10
Fig. 11
Fig. 12
Fig. 13
Fig. 14
Fig. 15
Fig. 16
Fig. 17

Abbreviations

\(\Delta \varOmega \) :

Frequency deviation

\(\Delta {P_\mathrm{L}}\) :

Change in load

\({\tau }_\mathrm{T}\) :

Turbine time constant

\({\tau }_\mathrm{g}\) :

Governor time constant

H :

Generator inertia constant

D :

Frequency-sensitive load coefficient

f :

Nominal frequency

R :

Speed regulation

\({\tau }_\mathrm{A}\) :

Amplifier’s time constant

\(K_\mathrm{A}\) :

Amplifier’s gain

\({\tau }_\mathrm{E}\) :

Exciter’s time constant

\(K_\mathrm{E}\) :

Exciter’s gain

\({\tau }_\mathrm{G}\) :

Generator’s time constant

\(K_\mathrm{G}\) :

Generator’s gain

\({\tau }_\mathrm{R}\) :

Sensor’s time constant

\(K_\mathrm{R}\) :

Sensor’s gain

References

  1. Abdallah, Y., Zheng, Z., Shroff, N. B., Gamal, H. El, & Fouly, T. El. (2016). The impact of stealthy attacks on smart grid performance: Tradeoffs and implications. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 4(4), 886–898.

  2. Biswas, S., & Sarwat, A. (2016). Vulnerabilities in two-area Automatic Generation Control systems under cyberattack. In Resilience week, 2016, IEEE (pp. 40–45).

  3. Cameron, C., Patsios, C., Taylor, P., & Pourmirza, Z. (2018). Using self-organizing architectures to mitigate the impacts of denial-of-service attacks on voltage control schemes. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 10(3), 3010–3019.

  4. Case, D. U. (2016). Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid. In Electricity Information sharing and analysis center.

  5. Chen, Y., Huang, S., Liu, F., Wang, Z., & Sun, X. (2018). Evaluation of reinforcement learning based false data injection attack to automatic voltage control. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 10(2), 2158–2169.

  6. Deng, R., Xiao, G., Lu, R., Liang, H., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2017). False data injection on state estimation in power systems—Attacks, impacts and defense: A survey. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 13(2), 411–423.

  7. Ericsson, G. N. (2010). Cyber security and power system communication-essential parts of a smart grid infrastructure. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 25(3), 1501–1507.

  8. Fang, X., Misra, S., Xue, G., & Yang, D. (2012). Smart gird—The new and improved power grid: A survey. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 14(4), 944–980.

  9. Farraj, A. K., Hammad, E. M., Daoud, A. Al & Kundur, D. (2014). A game-theoretic control approach to mitigate cyber switching attacks in smart grid systems. In Proceedings of IEEE international conference on smart grid communications (pp. 958–963).

  10. Farraj, A., Hammad, E., & Kundur, D. (2016). A cyber-physical control framework for transient stability in smart grids. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 9(2), 1205–1215.

  11. Gharavi, H., & Ghafurian, R. (2011). Smart grid: The electric energy system of the future. Proceedings of the IEEE, 99(6), 917–921.

  12. Giraldo, J., Cardenas, A., & Quijano, N. (2016). Integrity attacks on real-time pricing in smart grids: Impact and countermeasures. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 8(5), 2249–2257.

  13. Gungor, V. C., Sahin, D., Kocak, T., Ergut, S., Buccella, C., Cecati, C., et al. (2011). Smart grid technologies: Communication technologies and standards. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 7(4), 529–539.

  14. Hassan, M., Roy, N. K., & Sahabuddin, M. (2016). Mitigation of frequency disturbance in power systems during cyber-attack. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Electrical, Computer, Telecommunications Engineering. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICECTE.2016.7879601.

  15. Isozaki, Y., Yoshizawa, S., Fujimoto, Y., Ishii, H., Ono, I., Onoda, T., et al. (2016). Detection of cyber-attacks against voltage control in distribution power grids with PVs. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 7(4), 1824–1835.

  16. Li, Z., Shahidehpour, M., Alabdulwaheb, A., & Abusorrah, A. (2016). Bilevel model for analyzing coordinated cyber-physical attacks on power systems. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 7(5), 2260–2272.

  17. Liu, X., Li, Z., & Wen, Y. (2017). Cyber attacks against the economic operation of power systems: A fast solution. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 8(2), 1023–1025.

  18. Liu, X., Shahidehpour, M., Li, Z., Liu, X., Cao, Y., & Li, Z. (2017). Power system risk assessment in cyber attacks considering the role of protection systems. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 8(2), 572–580.

  19. Locke, G., & Gallagher, P. D. (2010). NIST framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards, release 1.0. In National Institute of Standards and Technology (Vol. 33).

  20. Majumdar, A., Agalgaonkar, Y. P., Pal, B. C., & Gottschalg, R. (2018). Centralized volt–var optimization strategy considering malicious attack on distributed energy resources control. IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy, 9(1), 148–156.

  21. Nagendra, M., & Krishnarayalu, M. S. (2012). PID controller tuning using simulink for multi area power systems. International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology, 1(7), 1–9.

  22. Nagendra, M., & Krishnarayalu, M. S. (2013). AGC and AVR of multi area power systems with and without GRC nonlinearity. International Journal of Advanced Research in Electrical, Electronics and Instrumentation Engineering, 2(6), 2117–2126.

  23. Saadat, H. (1999). Power system analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.

  24. Sahabuddin, M., Dutta, B., & Hassan, M. (2016). Impact of cyber-attack on isolated power system. In Proceedings of IEEE 3rd International Conference on Electrical Engineering and Information Communication Technology. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEEOCT.2016.7873088.

  25. Sridhar, S., & Govindarasu, M. (2014). Model-based attack detection and mitigation for automatic generation control. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 5(2), 580–591.

  26. Sridhar, S., & Manimaran, G. (2010). Data integrity attacks and their impacts on SCADA control system (pp. 1–6). IEEE: Power and Energy Society General Meeting.

  27. Sridhar, S., Hahn, A., & Govindarasu, M. (2012). Cyber-physical system security for the electric power grid. Proceedings of the IEEE, 100(1), 210–224.

  28. Tan, R., Krishna, V. B., Yau, D. K. Y., & Kalbarczyk, Z. (2013). Impact of integrity attacks on real-time pricing in smart grids. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 439–450).

  29. Tan, R., Nguyen, H. H., Foo, E. Y., Yau, D. K., Kalbarczyk, Z., Iyer, R. K., et al. (2017). Modeling and mitigating impact of false data injection attacks on automatic generation control. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 12(7), 1609–1624.

  30. Teixeira, A., Dan, G., Sandberg, H., Berthier, R., Bobba, R. B., & Valdes, A. (2014). Security of smart distribution grids: Data integrity attacks on integrated volt/VAR control and countermeasures. In Proceedings of IEEE American control conference (pp. 4372–4378).

  31. Ten, C. W., Liu, C. C., & Manimaran, G. (2008). Vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity for SCADA systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 23(4), 18636–1846.

  32. Ten, C. W., Manimaran, G., & Liu, C. C. (2010). Cybersecurity for critical infrastructures: Attack and defense modeling. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Humans, 40(4), 853–865.

  33. Thomas, M. S., & McDonald, J. D. (2015). Power system SCADA and smart grids. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

  34. Yan, Y., Qian, Y., Sharif, H., & Tipper, D. (2012). A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 14(4), 998–1010.

Download references

Author information

Correspondence to M. S. Rana.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Rahman, M.A., Rana, M.S. & Pota, H.R. Mitigation of Frequency and Voltage Disruptions in Smart Grid During Cyber-Attack. J Control Autom Electr Syst (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40313-020-00574-z

Download citation

Keywords

  • Smart grid
  • Cyber-attack
  • Automatic generation control (AGC)
  • Automatic voltage regulator (AVR)
  • Vulnerable parameters