Growth and Insecure Private Property of Capital

  • Bertrand CrettezEmail author
  • Naila Hayek
  • Lisa Morhaim


This paper revisits Strulik’s model of growth with insecure property rights. In this model, different social groups devote some effort to control a share of the capital stock. We show that a slight variation in the modeling of strategic interactions results in the coexistence of savings and efforts to control a share of the capital stock. We also study the effects of a change in the number of social groups on growth. We also show that an increase in social fractionalization may lead to less effort devoted to control capital and to a higher growth rate.


Dynamic games Insecure private property of capital Growth 

JEL Classification

C 73 D 02 D72 E 22 O 11 O 43 



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CREDUniversité Panthéon-Assas, Paris IIParisFrance

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