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Theory-choice, transient diversity and the efficiency of scientific inquiry

  • AnneMarie Borg
  • Daniel Frey
  • Dunja ŠešeljaEmail author
  • Christian Straßer
Paper in Formal Methods and Exact Sciences
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. EPSA17: Selected papers from the biannual conference in Exeter

Abstract

Recent studies of scientific interaction based on agent-based models (ABMs) suggest that a crucial factor conducive to efficient inquiry is what Zollman (2010) has dubbed ‘transient diversity’. It signifies a process in which a community engages in parallel exploration of rivaling theories lasting sufficiently long for the community to identify the best theory and to converge on it. But what exactly generates transient diversity? And is transient diversity a decisive factor when it comes to the efficiency of inquiry? In this paper we examine the impact of different conditions on the efficiency of inquiry, as well as the relation between diversity and efficiency. This includes certain diversity-generating mechanisms previously proposed in the literature (such as different social networks and cautious decision-making), as well as some factors that have so far been neglected (such as evaluations underlying theory-choice performed by scientists). This study is obtained via an argumentation-based ABM (Borg et al. 2017, 2018). Our results suggest that cautious decision-making does not always have a significant impact on the efficiency of inquiry while different evaluations underlying theory-choice and different social networks do. Moreover, we find a correlation between diversity and a successful performance of agents only under specific conditions, which indicates that transient diversity is sometimes not the primary factor responsible for efficiency. Altogether, when comparing our results to those obtained by structurally different ABMs based on Zollman’s work, the impact of specific factors on efficiency of inquiry, as well as the role of transient diversity in achieving efficiency, appear to be highly dependent on the underlying model.

Keywords

Agent-based modeling Cautious decision-making Theory-choice Transient diversity Scientific inquiry Scientific interaction 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on the previous draft of this paper.

The research by AnneMarie Borg and Christian Straßer is supported by a Sofja Kovalevskaja award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and by the German Ministry for Education and Research.

The research of Dunja Šešelja is supported by the DFG (Research Grant HA 3000/9-1).

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Philosophy IIRuhr-University BochumBochumGermany
  2. 2.Faculty of Economics and Social SciencesHeidelberg UniversityHeidelbergGermany
  3. 3.Munich Center for Mathematical PhilosophyLMU MunichMunichGermany

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