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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 299–318 | Cite as

The Self Shows Up in Experience

  • Matt DuncanEmail author
Article

Abstract

I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought insertion, in particular—to argue that Hume and his follows are wrong: The self does, in fact, show up in experience.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Ross Cameron, Brie Gertler, Trip Glazer, George Graham, Harold Langsam, John Mahlan, Trenton Merricks, Andrew Morgan, Paul Nedelisky, Nick Rimell, Rush Stewart, Adam Tiller, audiences at the University of Virginia, the Rhode Island Philosophical Society, and the Virginia Philosophical Association, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rhode Island CollegeProvidenceUSA

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