Democracy and Economic Growth: a Literature Review

  • Wafa GhardallouEmail author
  • Dorsaf Sridi


Given the importance of the joint analysis of the economic and political process, several researchers have examined the effect of the political regime on economic growth and development. The great majority of these researchers are crystallized on the assessment of the economic impact of a democratic political system in relation to an autocratic political regime. The aim of this review is to analyze the existing theoretical literature that underlines the effects of a democratic political system on economic growth with a brief look at some related models. Particularly, the paper examines channels through which democracy could affect growth and development.


Democracy Autocracy Economic growth 

JEL Classifications

G18 O16 P16 



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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Orleans Economics Laboratory (LEO)University of OrleansOrléans Cedex 2France
  2. 2.CBA Research Center, Department of Accounting, College of Business AdministrationPrincess Noura Bint Abdulrahman UniversityRiyadhSaudi Arabia
  3. 3.Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management (FSEG)University of SousseSousseTunisia

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