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Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 357–378 | Cite as

Kooperationsfaktoren in den Klimaverhandlungen: Eine vergleichende Analyse der Klimagipfel in Kopenhagen 2009 und in Paris 2015

  • Maximilian HöglEmail author
Essay

Zusammenfassung

Interdisziplinäre Forschungen zeigen, dass sieben Faktoren bestimmen, ob Individuen bei Problemen gemeinsam genutzter Ressourcen kooperieren: Reziprozität, Vertrauen, Kommunikation, Reputation, Fairness, Sanktion und Wir-Identität. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Übertragbarkeit dieser Erkenntnisse auf die Ebene der internationalen Beziehungen. Ein Vergleich der Kopenhagener und der Pariser Klimakonferenz zeigt, dass Veränderungen bei den Faktoren Vertrauen und Kommunikation, Sanktion, Fairness, Reputation und Reziprozität maßgeblich zum Erfolg der Pariser Konferenz beitrugen.

Schlüsselwörter

Klimaverhandlungen Pariser Abkommen UNFCCC Kooperationsfaktoren Reziprozität 

Enabling Factors for Cooperation at the Climate Negotiations: A Comparative Analysis of Copenhagen 2009 and Paris 2015

Abstract

Interdisciplinary research shows that seven factors determine whether individuals cooperate in the face of common pool resource problems: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity. This article examines whether these insights can be transferred to the level of international relations. A comparison of the climate conferences in Copenhagen and in Paris indicates that changes within the factors trust and communication, enforcement, fairness, reputation and reciprocity contributed substantially to the success of the Paris Conference.

Keywords

Climate negotiations Paris Agreement UNFCCC Enabling factors for cooperation Reciprocity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Deutsches Institut für EntwicklungspolitikBonnDeutschland

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