Drohnen/UAV-unterstützte Missionen in internationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen: Ein Indikator für demokratische sicherheitspolitische Prävalenz und Präferenzen?

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Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Artikel widmet sich aus der Perspektive der Demokratischen Friedenstheorie der Präsenz als auch den Motivationsfaktoren von Demokratien und Autokratien hinsichtlich der Verwendung von Drohnen (UAVs) in den Missionen internationaler Sicherheitsinstitutionen (NATO, EU, UN und OSZE). Die Analyse demonstriert die höhere Relevanz, die Demokratien UAV-Elementen in internationalen Missionen zurechnen sowie steuerungs- bzw. effektivitätsorientierte Motivationsfaktoren hinsichtlich der Nutzung von Drohnen durch Demokratien in internationalen Missionen.

Schlüsselwörter

Demokratien Drohnen Demokratische Friedenstheorie Autokratien Internationale Friedensmissionen 

UAV-Missions in International Security Organisations: An Indicator for Democratic Prevalence and Preferences?

Abstract

The following contribution accesses the motivations of democracies and autocracies concerning the use of UAVs in international peace operations in the context of the NATO, the CSDP, the UN and the OSCE. The analysis displays the prevailing significance allocated by democracies to UAVs in international peacekeeping operations as well as steering-orientated and effectiveness-orientated interests concerning the democratic use of UAVs.

Keywords

Democracies UAVs Democratic peace Autocracies Security missions 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für PolitikwissenschaftenFernUniversität in HagenHagenDeutschland
  2. 2.Institut für PolitikwissenschaftJustus-Liebig-Universität GießenGießenDeutschland

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