Advertisement

Neuroethics

pp 1–11 | Cite as

Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence

  • Derk Pereboom
Original Paper
  • 143 Downloads

Abstract

The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that (1) rejects retributive justification for punishment; (2) does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and (3) actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized the quarantine analogy for incapacitation together with the value of rehabilitation and reintegration. Here I pay special attention to the permissibility and the limits of general deterrence.

Keywords

Incapacitation Punishment Retribution Deterrence, preventative detention Reintegration 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Victor Tadros, Dana Nelkin, Michael McKenna, Michael Corrado, Jennifer Chandler, Gregg Caruso, two anonymous reviewers for Neuroethics, and audiences at Cornell University, the University of Gothenburg, the American Philosophical Association Meetings in Seattle (2017), and the University of Ghent for valuable comments and discussion.

References

  1. 1.
    Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. In The collected works of Spinoza. 1. Ed. and Trans. Edwin Curley, 408–617. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Strawson, Galen. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1): 5–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Pereboom, D. 2001. Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Pereboom, D. 2013. Free will skepticism and criminal punishment. In The future of punishment, ed. Thomas Nadelhoffer, 49–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Pereboom, D. 2014. Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Pereboom, D. 1995. Determinism al dente. Noûs 29: 21–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Smilansky, Saul. 2000. Free will and illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Levy, Neil. 2011. Hard luck: How luck undermines free will and moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Waller, Bruce. 2011. Against moral responsibility. Cambridge: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Waller, Bruce. 2015. The stubborn system of moral responsibility. Cambridge: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Caruso, Gregg D. 2012. Free will and consciousness: A determinist account of the illusion of free will. Lexington: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Caruso, Gregg D. 2016. Free will skepticism and criminal behavior: A public health quarantine model. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1): 25–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Caruso, Gregg D. 2017. Public health and safety: The social determinants of health and criminal behavior. UK: ResearchLinks Books.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Caruso, Gregg D. Forthcoming. The public health-quarantine model. In The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, ed. Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Pereboom, Derk, and Gregg D. Caruso. 2018. Hard-incompatibilist existentialism: Neuroscience, punishment, and meaning in life. In Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age of neuroscience, ed. Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flaneagan, 193–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Pereboom, Derk. 2017. A defense of free will skepticism: Replies to commentaries by victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3): 617–636.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Kant, Immanuel. 1790. The metaphysics of morals. Tr. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Justice and personal desert. In his Doing and deserving. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Scanlon, T.M. 2013. Giving desert its due. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2): 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Rawls, John. 1955. Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review 64: 3–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Dennett, Daniel C. 1984. Elbow room. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Dennett, Daniel C. 2003. Freedom evolves. New York: Viking Press.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Vargas, Manuel. 2013. Building better beings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Pereboom, Derk. 2017. Responsibility, regret, and protest. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 4: 121–140.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Hieronymi, Pamela. 2001. Articulating an uncompromising forgiveness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 529–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Smith, Angela. 2013. Moral blame and moral protest. In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, ed. Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates, 27–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Morse, S. 2004. Reasons, results, and criminal responsibility. University of Illinois Law Review 2: 363–444.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Morse, Stephen J. 2013. Common ecriminal law compatibilism. In Neuroscience and legal responsibility, ed. Nicole A. Vincent, 29–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Moore, Michael S. 1987. The moral worth of retribution. In PunishmePlease provide complete bibliographic details of this referencent and rehabilitation, third edition, ed. Jeffrie G. Murphy, 94–130. Wadsworth.Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Moore, Michael S. 1998. Placing blame. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Husak, Douglas. 2000. Holistic retributivism. California Law Review 88: 991–1000.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Berman, Mitchell. 2008. Punishment and justification. Ethics 18: 258–290.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. 34.
    Kershnar, Stephen. 2000. A defense of retributivism. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1): 97–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. 35.
    Alexander, Larry, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen Morse. 2009. Crime and culpability: A theory of criminal law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Vilhauer, Benjamin. 2009. Free will and reasonable doubt. American Philosophical Quarterly 46: 131–140.Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Caruso, Gregg D. 2018. Justice without retribution: An epistemic argument against retributive criminal punishment. Neuroethics.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9357-8.
  38. 38.
    Bentham, Jeremy. 1823/1948. An introduction to the principles of moral and legislation. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    Nelkin, Dana. Forthcoming. Duties, desert, and the justification of punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy. Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Farrell, Daniel M. 1985. The justification of general deterrence. The Philosophical Review 104: 367–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. 41.
    Quinn, Warren. 1985. The right to threaten and the right to punish. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 327–373.Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    Kelly, Erin. 2009. Criminal justice without retribution. Journal of Philosophy 106: 440–462.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. 43.
    Focquaert, Farah, Andrea L. Glenn, and Adrian Raine. 2018. Free will skepticism, freedom, and criminal behavior. In Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age of neuroscience, ed. Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flanagan, 235–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  44. 44.
    Schoeman, Ferdinand. 1979. On incapacitating the dangerous. American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 27–35.Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    Choy, Olivia, Farah Focquaert, and Adrian Raine. 2018. Benign biological interventions to reduce offending. Neuroethics.Google Scholar
  46. 46.
    Raine, Adrian. 2013. The anatomy of violence: The biological roots of crime. Allen Lane.Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    Focquaert, Farah. 2018. Neurobiology and crime: A neuro-ethical perspective. Journal of Criminal Justice forthcoming.Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    Tadros, Victor. 2017. Doing without desert. Criminal Law and Philosophy 11: 605–616.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. 49.
    Tadros, Victor. 2016. Wrongs and crimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. 50.
    Kleiman, Mark. 2009. When brute force fails: How to have less crime and less punishment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. 51.
    Boonin, David. 2008. The problem of punishment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. 52.
    Smilanksy, Saul. 2017. Pereboom on punishment: Funishment, innocence, motivation, and other difficulties. Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3): 591–603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. 53.
    Smilansky, Saul. 2011. Hard determinism and punishment: A practical reductio. Law and Philosophy 39: 353–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. 54.
    Corrado, Michael L. 1996. Punishment and the wild beast of prey: The problem of preventive detention. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 778: 1–32.Google Scholar
  55. 55.
    Levy, Neil. Skepticism and sanction: the benefits of denying moral responsibility. Law and Philosophy 31: 477–493.Google Scholar
  56. 56.
    Corrado, Michael L. 2016. Two models of criminal justice. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757078
  57. 57.
    Corrado, Michael L. Punishment and the Burden of Proof. 2017. UNC Legal Studies Research Paper. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997654 or  https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997654
  58. 58.
    Lemos, John. 2016. Moral concerns about responsibility denial and the quarantine of violent criminals. Law and Philosophy 35 (5): 461–483.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

Personalised recommendations