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Acta Analytica

, Volume 34, Issue 4, pp 427–446 | Cite as

Sentimentalist Contractualism—the First Steps

  • Nenad Miscevic
Article

Abstract

The paper connects two central ethical views, both with a rich tradition, sentimentalism and contractualism. From the former, it also borrows the response-dependentist metaphysics. The idea of combining the two has been sketched before, but not systematically and explicitly; for instance, in various comments on classical authors, especially on Kant and elsewhere, most prominently in Habermas. Here is the kernel of the present proposal. Our initial practical intuitions are emotion-based and the values, when detected, are response-dependent. This is the starting point borrowed from sentimentalism. These intuitions get improved by reflection, and by dialogue that crucially involves perspective taking. If all goes well, this results in insights, in particular into principles that all rational parties can agree about in a kind of “contract.” This brings two traditions, the one of David Hume and Adam Smith, and the other of Kant, together. The resulting theory would be a kind of sentimentalist, response-dependentist contractualism.

Keywords

Sentimentalism Contractualism Response-dependence Fitting emotions Buck-passing 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MariborMariborSlovenia
  2. 2.Central European UniversityBudapestHungary
  3. 3.RijekaCroatia

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