In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought

  • Víctor M. VerdejoEmail author


Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I (i) show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, (ii) rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way of thinking and thought-individuating cognitive value, (iii) outline an account of self-thought that rejects the assumption and keeps intact all of Frege’s chief claims, and (iv) respond to a number of worries to the effect that this proposal yields undesirable results from the point of view of the individuation of self-thought at the level of cognitive value.


First person Frege Perspective Cognitive value Thought sharing 



An earlier vesion of this paper was presented at the workshop Perspectival Knowledge and Experience of the Self held at University College London and organised by María José Frápolli and myself..I am deeply grateful to the audience and especially Marie Guillot, Mike Martin, Krisztina Orbán, Christopher Peacocke, Simon Prosser and Hong Yu Wong for their stimulating ideas and feedback. I also thank my colleagues at Logos Research Group (University of Barcelona) for very rewarding discussions of these issues..This research has received the generous support of the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Departament of Economy and Knowledge (Catalan Government), and also the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Spanish Government) and the European Union through the research projects FFI2016-80588-R and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU).

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Conflict of Interest

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS Research Group/BIAP (Barcelona Institute of Analytic Philosophy)University of BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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