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Acta Analytica

, Volume 34, Issue 1, pp 83–115 | Cite as

Relevance and Non-Factive Knowledge Attributions

  • Filippo DomaneschiEmail author
  • Simona Di Paola
Article

Introduction

Over the last decades, the notion of knowledge has raised a complex debate in philosophy and cognitive science about the problem of determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge attribution. According to the traditional tripartite analysis, entertaining a justified true belief is both necessary and sufficient to have knowledge. 1 That is to say, a cognitive subject S knows a proposition p if and only if:
  1. (i)

    p is true

     
  2. (ii)

    S believes that p

     
  3. (iii)

    The belief entertained by S is justified

     

The third condition has been questioned for at least two reasons. First of all, epistemologists disagree on what counts as justification. On the one hand, internalists take justification to depend solely on the cognitive subject’s internal mental states. On the other hand, by focusing on beliefs produced by reliably cognitive processes, externalists take into account aspects somehow external to the mere analysis of one’s internal mental states. Moreover,...

Notes

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interests

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DISFOR—Department of Educational Sciences, Psychology Unit, Laboratory of Psychology of LanguageUniversity of GenoaGenoaItaly

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