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Plantinga Redux: Is the Scientific Realist Committed to the Rejection of Naturalism?

  • Abraham GraberEmail author
  • Luke Golemon
Article
  • 32 Downloads

Abstract

While Plantinga has famously argued that acceptance of neo-Darwinian theory commits one to the rejection of naturalism, Plantinga’s argument is vulnerable to an objection developed by Evan Fales. Not only does Fales’ objection undermine Plantinga’s original argument, it establishes a general challenge which any attempt to revitalize Plantinga’s argument must overcome. After briefly laying out the contours of this challenge, we attempt to meet it by arguing that because a purely naturalistic account of our etiology cannot explain the correlation between our preference for simplicity and simplicity’s ability to serve as a veridical method of theory selection, the scientific realist is committed to the rejection of naturalism.

Keywords

Plantinga Fales Naturalism Scientific realism Natural theology 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and ClassicsUniversity of Texas at San AntonioSan AntonioUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyWestern Michigan UniversityKalamazooUSA

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