Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes

  • Derk PereboomEmail author
Original Paper


In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros argues that wrongdoers acquire special duties to those they’ve wronged, and from there he generates wrongdoers’ duties to contribute to general deterrence by being punished. In support, he contends that my manipulation argument against compatibilism fails to show that causal determination is incompatible with the proposed duties wrongdoers owe to those they’ve wronged. I respond that I did not intend my manipulation argument to rule out a sense of moral responsibility that features such duties, and that I don’t believe it does. In fact, I’m willing to accept a restricted version of Tadros’s proposal, and I explain how this addition modifies the self-defense-based position on deterrence that I’ve defended in the past.


Punishment General deterrence Special deterrence Retribution Self-defense Free will Desert Quarantine Duty Compensation 



Thanks to Dana Nelkin, Victor Tadros, and Alex Kaiserman for valuable discussion.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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