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Cognitive Neurodynamics

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 121–123 | Cite as

Placing pure experience of Eastern tradition into the neurophysiology of Western tradition

  • Andrew A. FingelkurtsEmail author
  • Alexander A. Fingelkurts
Brief Communication
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While the presence or absence of consciousness plays the central role in the moral/ethical decisions when dealing with patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), recently it is criticized as not adequate due to number of reasons, among which are the lack of the uniform definition of consciousness and consequently uncertainty of diagnostic criteria for it, as well as irrelevance of some forms of consciousness for determining a patient’s interests and wishes. In her article, Dr. Specker Sullivan reexamined the meaning of consciousness in the DOC taxonomy and proposed to go away from the routinely used clinical definition of consciousness as “wakeful awareness”, and adopt the meaning that is common in the Eastern tradition which is a form of “pure experience” (Specker Sullivan 2018). She further argued that understanding consciousness as a “pure experience” is ethically relevant for DOC patients. This suggestion is original, novel and important since it preserves the importance of...

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew A. Fingelkurts
    • 1
    Email author
  • Alexander A. Fingelkurts
    • 1
  1. 1.BM-Science – Brain and Mind Technologies Research CentreEspooFinland

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