Do domestic politics shape U.S. influence in the World Bank?

  • Erasmus KerstingEmail author
  • Christopher Kilby


Do U.S. presidential administrations exert more informal influence over international financial institutions when they face an uncooperative Congress and thus have less control over bilateral aid? Reexamining four empirical studies of the World Bank, we demonstrate that U.S. informal influence is driven by years with divided U.S. government. This provides a richer picture of when and why the U.S. exerts influence in multilateral settings and an alternate explanation to persistent questions about the role of international organizations in the international political economy.


World Bank Divided government Geopolitics of aid 

JEL Clasification

F35 F53 O19 

Supplementary material

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Villanova UniversityVillanovaUSA

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