Advertisement

The Review of International Organizations

, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 335–357 | Cite as

Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union’s economic agreements

  • Daniela Donno
  • Michael Neureiter
Article

Abstract

The insertion of human rights commitments into international economic agreements is now a widespread practice. We argue that the effect of such commitments depends on the degree of leverage held by one partner over the other. In a comprehensive analysis of the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with developing countries, we find that human rights clauses are conditionally effective; they are associated with improved political freedom and physical integrity rights only in countries that are more heavily dependent on EU aid. An in-depth look at the EU’s enforcement of its human rights clause in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group reveals that the Union most often responds to violations of political rights—particularly coups and flawed elections—and that enforcement is indeed a more powerful catalyst for change in highly aid-dependent states. Alternative explanations—that the impact of the human rights clause depends on legalization, the country’s strategic importance, NGO activity, or domestic institutions—find little support.

Keywords

Human rights European Union Foreign aid International law 

Supplementary material

11558_2017_9283_MOESM1_ESM.docx (162 kb)
ESM 1 (DOCX 161 kb)
11558_2017_9283_MOESM2_ESM.do (35 kb)
ESM 2 (DO 35 kb)
11558_2017_9283_MOESM3_ESM.dta (3.6 mb)
ESM 3 (DTA 3636 kb)

References

  1. Achen, C. (2002). Toward a new political methodology: Microfoundations and ART. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 423–450.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical power Europe? International Affairs, 84(1), 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Aldrich, J., & Cnudde, C. F. (1975). Probing the bounds of conventional wisdom: A comparison of Regression, Probit, and discriminant analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 19(3), 571–608.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Andersen, Robert. 2004. Regression models for ordinal data. In Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao (eds.) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods: Volume 3. Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 941-942.Google Scholar
  5. Apodaca, C., & Stohl, M. (1999). United States human rights policy and foreign assistance. International Studies Quarterly, 43, 185–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Arts, K. (2000). Integrating human rights into development cooperation: The case of the Lomé Convention. Cambridge: Kluwer Law International.Google Scholar
  7. Balfour, R. (2006). Principles of democracy and human rights. In S. Lucarelli & I. Manners (Eds.), Values and principles in European Union foreign policy. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  8. Bartels, L. (2005). Human rights conditionality in the EU’s international agreements. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bearce, D. H., & Tirone, D. C. (2010). Foreign aid effectiveness and the strategic goals of donor governments. Journal of Politics, 72(3), 837–851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Berry, W. D., Golder, M., & Milton, D. (2012). Improving tests of theories positing interaction. The Journal of Politics, 74(3), 653–671.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Bonaglia, F., Goldstein, A., & Petito, F. (2006). Values in European Union development and cooperation policy. In S. Lucarelli & I. Manners (Eds.), Values and principles in European Union foreign policy. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  12. Bradley, A. (2005). An ACP perspective and overview of article 96 cases. The European Centre for Development Policy Management, August. http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/DP-64D-ACP-Perspective-Overview-Article96-Cases-2005.pdf.
  13. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Downs, G. W., Smith, A., & Cherif, F. M. (2005). Thinking inside the box: A closer look at democracy and human rights. International Studies Quarterly, 49, 439–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe: Introduction and framework. International Organization, 59(Fall), 801–826.Google Scholar
  15. Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (1999). Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 407–417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (2008). The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset Version, 2008.03.12 http://www.humanrightsdata.org.
  17. Clement, D. (2012). Human rights in Canadian domestic and foreign politics. Human Rights Quarterly, 34(3), 751–778.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Conrad, C. R. (2014). Divergent incentives for dictators: Domestic institutions and (international Promises not to) torture. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(1), 34–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Conrad, C., & DeMeritt, J. (2013). Constrained by the Bank and the ballot: Unearned revenue, democracy and state incentives to repress. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 105–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Conrad, C., & Ritter, E. H. (2013). Treaties, tenure, and torture: The conflicting domestic effects of international law. Journal of Politics, 75(2), 397–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C. H., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Miri, F., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Staton, J., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-t., & Zimmerman, B. (2015). V-Dem [country-year/country-date] dataset v5. Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project.Google Scholar
  22. Crawford, G. (1997). Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency. Democratization, 4(3), 69–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Crawford, G. (2001). Foreign aid and political reform: A comparative analysis of democracy assistance and political conditionality. New York: Palgrave.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Cuyckens, H. (2010). Human rights clauses in agreements between the community and third countries: The case of the Cotonou agreement. Working Paper, March. https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP147e.pdf.
  25. Dai, X. (2005). Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. International Organization, 59(Spring), 363–398.Google Scholar
  26. Davenport, C. (2007). State repression and political order. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Davenport, C. (2010). State repression and the domestic democratic Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Davenport, C., & Armstrong, D. A. (2004). Democracy and the violations of human rights: A statistical analysis from 1976 to 1996. American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 538–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. De Felice, D. (2015). Diverging visions on political conditionality: The role of domestic politics and international socialization in French and British aid. World Development, 75, 26–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Del Biondo, K. (2011). EU aid conditionality in ACP countries: Explaining inconsistency in EU sanctions practice. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 7(3), 380–395.Google Scholar
  31. Donno, D. (2010). Who is punished? Regional intergovernmental Organizations and the enforcement of democratic norms. International Organization, 64(4), 593–625.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Donno, D. (2013). Defending democratic norms: International actors and the politics of electoral misconduct. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Dunning, T. (2004). Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold war politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa. International Organization, 58(2), 409–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Emmanuel, N. G. (2013). Democratization in Malawi: Responding to international and domestic pressures. African and Asian Studies, 12, 415–434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. European Council. (2015). Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement–Consultation Procedure. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-africa/article-96-cotonou-agreement/. Accessed June 2015.
  36. Fariss, C. J. (2014). Respect for human rights has improved over time: Modeling the changing standard of accountability. American Political Science Review, 108(2), 297–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Fariss, C. J. (forthcoming). The changing standard of accountability and the positive relationship between human rights treaty ratification and compliance. British Journal of Political Science.Google Scholar
  38. Fariss, C. J., & Schnakenberg, K. E. (2014). Measuring mutual dependence between state repressive actions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(6), 1003–1032.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011). Human Rights in German Development Policy. BMZ Strategy Paper 4.Google Scholar
  40. Fierro, E. (2003). The EU’s approach to human rights conditionality in practice. New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.Google Scholar
  41. Furuoka, F. (2005). Human rights conditionality and aid allocation: Case study of Japanese foreign aid policy. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 4(2), 125–146.Google Scholar
  42. Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new dataset. Perspectives on Politics, 12(2), 313–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Girod, D. M. (2012). Effective foreign aid following civil war: The nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1), 188–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Reseearch, 39(5), 615–637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Goemans, H., & Marinov, N. (2014). Coups and democracy. British Journal of Political Science, 44(4), 799–825.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression. International Organization, 59(3), 593–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2008). Sticks and stones: Naming and shaming the human rights enforcement problem. International Organization, 62(4), 689–716.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2009). Forced to be good: Why trade agreements boost human rights. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  49. Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Tsutsui, K. (2005). Human rights in a globalizing world: The paradox of empty Promises. American Journal of Sociology, 110(5), 1373–1411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Tsutsui, K. (2007). Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most. Journal of Peace Research, 44(4), 407–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Harbom, L., & Wallensteen, P. (2009). Armed conflicts, 1946-2008. Journal of Peace Research, 46(4), 577–587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Hathaway, O. (2003). The cost of commitment. Stanford law Review, 55(5), 1821–1862.Google Scholar
  53. Hathaway, O. (2005). Between power and principle: An integrated theory of international law. The University of Chicaco law Review, 72(2), 469–536.Google Scholar
  54. Hazelzet, H. (2005). Suspension of development cooperation: An instrument to promote human rights and democracy? The European Centre for Development Policy Management, August. http://global.wisc.edu/development/resources/clayton-hazelzet.pdf.
  55. Hill, D. (2010). Estimating the effects of human rights treaties on state behavior. Journal of Politics, 72(4), 1161–1174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Holland, M. (2002). The European Union and the third world. New York: Palgrave.Google Scholar
  57. Hyde, S. D. (2011). The pseudo-Democrat's dilemma: Why election monitoring became an international norm. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2012). Causal inference without balance checking: Coarsened exact matching. Political Analysis, 20(1), 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. International Security, 20(1), 39–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Kim, H., & Sikkink, K. (2010). Explaining the deterrence effect of human rights prosecutions for transitional countries. International Studies Quarterly, 54, 939–963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. King, G., Zeng, L. (2007). When can history be our guide? The pitfalls of counterfactual inference. International Studies Quarterly, 51(1), 183–210.Google Scholar
  62. Kreutz, J. (2005). Hard measures by a soft power? Sanctions policy of the European Union 1981–2004. Bonn International Center for Conversion. http://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/paper45.pdf.
  63. Kreutz, J. (2015). Human rights, Geostrategy, and EU foreign policy, 1989-2008. International Organization, 69, 195–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. Leonard, M. (2005). Why Europe will run the 21st century. London: Fourth Estate.Google Scholar
  65. Lumley, T., Diehr, P., Emerson, S., & Lu, C. (2002). The importance of the normality assumption in large public health datasets. Annual Review of Public Health, 23, 151–169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Lupu, Y. (2013a). Best evidence: The role of Information in domestic judicial enforcement of international human rights agreements. International Organization, 67(3), 469–503.Google Scholar
  67. Lupu, Y. (2013b). The informative power of treaty commitment: Using the spatial model to address selection effects. American Journal of Political Science, 57(4), 912–925.Google Scholar
  68. Lupu, Y. (2015). Legislative veto players and the effects of international human rights agreements. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 578–594.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Mackie, J., & Zinke, J. (2005). When agreement breaks down, what next? The Cotonou Agreement’s article 96 consultation procedure. The European Centre for Development Policy Management, August. http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/DP-64A-Cotonou-Agreements-Article-96-Consultation-Procedure-2005.pdf.
  70. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  71. Manners, I. (2008). The normative ethics of the European Union. International Affairs, 84(1), 45–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  72. Mbangu, L. (2005). Recent cases of article 96 consultations. The European Centre for Development Policy Management, August. http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/DP-64C-Recent-Cases-Article96-Consultations-2005.pdf.
  73. Meernik, J., Krueger, E. L., & Poe, S. C. (1998). Testing models of U.S. foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the cold war. Journal of Politics, 60(1), 63–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  74. Miller, V. (2004). The human rights clause in the EU’s external agreements. House of Commons Library, Research Paper 04/33.Google Scholar
  75. Mosley, L. (2010). Labor rights and multinational production. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  76. Neumayer, E. (2003). Is respect for human rights rewarded? Human Rights Quarterly, 25, 510–527.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  77. Neumayer, E. (2005). Do International human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(6), 925–953.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  78. Nielsen, R. A. (2013). Rewarding human rights? Selective aid sanctions against repressive states. International Studies Quarterly, 57, 791–803.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  79. Orbie, J. (2011). Promoting labour standards through trade: Normative power or regulatory state Europe? In R. G. Whitman (Ed.), Normative power Europe: Empirical and theoretical Perspectives (pp. 161–184). UK: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  80. Piron, L.-H. (2005). Integrating human rights into development: A synthesis of donor approaches and experiences. Overseas Development Institute. Available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4404.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2017.
  81. Poe, S. C., & Tate, C. N. (1994). Repression of human rights to personal integrity in the 1980s: A global analysis. American Political Science Review, 88(4), 853–872.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  82. Portela, C. (2007). Aid suspensions as coercive tools? The European Union’s experience in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) context. Review of European and Russian Affairs, 3(2), 38–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  83. Portela, C. (2010). European Union sanctions and foreign policy: When and why do they work? New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  84. Portela, C., & Mbangu-Kiala, L. (2007). Political dialogue and human rights in the framework of the Cotonou agreement. Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 10 July. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/381397/EXPO-AFET_ET(2007)381397_EN.pdf.
  85. Powell, E. J., & Staton, J. K. (2009). Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation. International Studies Quarterly, 53, 149–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  86. Prorok, A. K., & Appel, B. J. (2014). Compliance with international humanitarian law: Democratic third parties and civilian targeting in interstate war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(4), 713–740.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  87. Richards, D. L. (2016). The myth of Information effects in human rights data. Human Rights Quarterly, 38(2), 477–492.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  88. Rubin, D. B. (1987). Multiple imputation for nonresponse in surveys. New York: J. Wiley & Sons.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  89. Saltnes, J. D. (2013). The EU’s human rights policy: Unpacking the literature on the EU’s implementation of aid conditionality. ARENA Centre for European Studies, March. http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2013/wp2-13.pdf.
  90. Schnakenberg, K. E., & Fariss, C. J. (2014). Dynamic patterns of human rights practices. Political Science Research and Methods, 2(01), 1–31.Google Scholar
  91. Schrodt, P. A. (2014). Seven deadly sins of contemporary quantitative political analysis. Journal of Peace Research, 51(2), 287–300.Google Scholar
  92. Simmons, B. A. (2009). Mobilizing for human rights: International law and domestic politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  93. Smith, K. E. (1998). The use of political conditionality in the EU's relations with third countries: How effective? European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, 253–274.Google Scholar
  94. Spilker, G., & Böhmelt, T. (2013). The impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental repression Revisited. Review of International Organizations, 8, 343–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  95. Szymanski, M., & Smith, M. E. (2005). Coherence and conditionality in European foreign policy: Negotiating the EU–Mexico global agreement. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(1), 171–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  96. Von Stein, J. (2015). Making Promises, keeping Promises: Democracy, ratification and compliance in international human rights law. British Journal of Political Science forthcoming (published online as FirstView).Google Scholar
  97. Whitman, R. G. (2011). Normative power Europe: Empirical and theoretical Perspectives, Palgrave studies in European Union. Politics: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  98. Wu, C.-H. (2013). The evolution of EU-ASEAN relations: Legal framework and policy change. National Taiwan University law Review, 8(2), 329–372.Google Scholar
  99. Youngs, R. (2004). Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s external identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(2), 415–435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  100. Zimelis, A. (2011). Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership: A misguided approach to development? Australian Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 389–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

Personalised recommendations