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Strategic Analysis of a Regulatory Conflict Using Dempster-Shafer Theory and AHP for Preference Elicitation

  • Maisa M. SilvaEmail author
  • Keith W. Hipel
  • D. Marc Kilgour
  • Ana Paula C. S. Costa
Article
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Abstract

Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) are integrated in order to elicit preference information from experts regarding decision makers (DMs) involved in a regulatory conflict. More precisely, DST is used for combining expert knowledge regarding preferences of a specific DM(the regulatory body), and AHP is employed for ranking feasible states in the conflict for this same DM. In order to illustrate how this preference elicitation proposal can be conveniently implemented in practice within theGraph Model for ConflictResolution (GMCR), it is applied to a real construction dispute located in the city of Ipojuca, Brazil. The conflict is modeled with three DMs: support, opposition, and the regulatory body. Results show that the new preference methodology possesses many inherent advantages including high flexibility, the ability to capture uncertainty or even ignorance about preferences, the possibility of combining expert knowledge with respect to missing preferences, and a substantial reduction in the number of pairwise comparisons of states required to express preference information.

Keywords

Regulatory conflict graph model for conflict resolution absence of preference information DST-AHP 

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Copyright information

© Systems Engineering Society of China and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maisa M. Silva
    • 1
    Email author
  • Keith W. Hipel
    • 2
  • D. Marc Kilgour
    • 3
  • Ana Paula C. S. Costa
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management EngineeringUniversidade Federal de PernambucoRecifeBrazil
  2. 2.Department of Systems Design EngineeringUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsWilfrid Laurier UniversityWaterlooCanada

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