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A Direct Method of Interval Banzhaf Values of Interval Cooperative Games

  • Kairong Liang
  • Dengfeng LiEmail author
Article
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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to develop a direct method for computing interval Banzhaf values for a class of interval cooperative games. In this method, it is proven that the Banzhaf values of the associated cooperative games of interval cooperative games are monotonic and non-decreasing functions of coalitions’ payoffs under weaker coalition monotonicity-like conditions. So the interval Banzhaf values can be explicitly obtained through using only the lower and upper bounds of the coalitions’ interval payoffs, respectively. The proposed method does not employ interval subtractions and hereby can effectively avoid the irrational issues such as irreversibility and uncertainty enlargement. We prove some important and desirable properties of the interval Banzhaf values and illustrate the applicability and validity of the proposed method with a numerical example.

Keywords

Interval cooperative game Banzhaf value group decision cooperative game 

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank referees for their help to improve the quality of the paper.

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Copyright information

© Systems Engineering Society of China and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economics and ManagementFuzhou UniversityFuzhouChina
  2. 2.School of Management and EconomicsUniversity of Electronic Science and Technology of ChinaChengduChina

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