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Partially known information attack on SM2 key exchange protocol

  • Wei WeiEmail author
  • Jiazhe Chen
  • Dan Li
  • Beibei Wang
Research Paper
  • 3 Downloads

Abstract

SM2 key exchange protocol is a part of the SM2 public key cryptographic algorithm based on elliptic curves which has been issued by Chinese State Cryptography Administration since 2010. Under the guide of Chinese government, SM2 has been widely used in Chinese commercial applications. This paper gives the first partially known information attack on SM2 key exchange protocol. Our attack is based on a technique modified from the hidden number problem (HNP) which was introduced originally to study the bit security of Diffie-Hellman and related schemes. We present a polynomial-time algorithm which could recover the user’s secret key when given about half least significant bits of the two unknown intermediate values in each congruence over about 30 to 40 instances. Compared with the standard HNP, our approach deals with congruence involved two independent unknown variables and each of them possesses the same size as the secret key. Moreover, our results almost coincide with the previous best result among the same field considering the extreme case in which one variant is completely revealed.

Keywords

SM2 key exchange protocol cryptanalysis information leakage lattice attack extended hidden number problem 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant Nos. 2016YFB0800902, 2016YFF0204004), and National Nature Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61402536). The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

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Copyright information

© Science China Press and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.China Information Technology Security Evaluation CenterBeijingChina
  2. 2.Institute for Advanced StudyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina

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