Optimal Switching Integrity Attacks on Sensors in Industrial Control Systems
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In this article, an optimal switching integrity attack problem is investigated to study the response of feedback control systems under attack. The authors model the malicious attacks on sensors as additive norm bounded signals. The authors consider an attacker who is only capable of launching attacks to limited number of sensors once a time and changing the combinations of attacked sensors all over the time. The objective of this paper is to find the optimal switching sequence of these combinations and the optimal attack input. The authors solve this problem by transforming it into a traditional optimal control problem with new control variables vary continuously in the range [0, 1]. The optimal solutions of the new control variables are of bang-bang-type. Therefore, an algebraic switching condition and an optimal attack input can be obtained. Finally, numerical results are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the methods.
KeywordsLimited number optimal control switching conditions switching integrity attack
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