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Philosophia

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 1087–1094 | Cite as

Direct Blameworthiness for Non-conduct?

  • E. J. CoffmanEmail author
Article

Abstract

Peter Graham (2017) argues against the prima facie plausible thesis that one can be directly blameworthy only for one’s conduct—that is, only for one’s actions or omissions to act. Because this thesis serves as a premise in a challenging recent argument for the revisionist conclusion that we’re at most rarely directly blameworthy for anything, Graham’s argument holds out a promise of contributing to a defense of a wide range of commonsense ascriptions of blameworthiness. After reconstructing Graham’s argument for the possibility of direct blameworthiness for non-conduct, I develop the following objection to it: in light of a clear counterexample, one of Graham’s two premises must be weakened, which in turn requires that Graham’s other premise be strengthened; unfortunately, the resulting strengthened premise is implausible on balance.

Keywords

Blame Blameworthiness Actions Omissions to act Constitutive moral luck Manipulation 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of TennesseeKnoxvilleUSA

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