, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 1283–1295 | Cite as

Double Defence Against Multiple Case Manipulation Arguments

  • Maria SekatskayaEmail author


The article aims to show that compatibilism can be defended against Pereboom’s ‘Four Case’ Manipulation Argument (Pereboom 2001), hereinafter referred to as 4-Case MA, by combining the soft-line and the hard-line replies. In the first section, I argue that the original version of the 4-Case MA was refuted by the soft-line reply, but Pereboom’s (2014) modified version of the argument can’t be refuted this way. In the second section, I analyse McKenna’s hard-line reply to the original Pereboom’s 4-Case MA and argue that it wasn’t completely successful. In section three, I present five new Pereboom-style cases. In section four, I argue that these new cases constitute a combination of the soft-line and hard-line defence against Pereboom’s modified multiple case manipulation argument.


Manipulation argument Hard-line reply Soft-line reply Moral responsibility Compatibilism 



This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation under Grant No. 18-18-00222.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Institute of PhilosophySt. Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia

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