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Passionate Akrasia

  • Michael T. MichaelEmail author


The standard philosophical account of akratic action is that it is action contrary to one’s current better judgment about what to do. While respecting the philosophical debate associated with this conception of akrasia, I attempt to offer a different perspective on the subject by suggesting that akratic action could be conceived more broadly as “action without due self-restraint.” Under such a broader conception, there may be several varieties of akrasia. Following Frank Jackson, I propose that a paradigmatic variety of akrasia is “passionate akrasia,” defined in terms of the undue influence of passion. I provide an account of passionate akrasia that builds on Jackson’s decision-theoretic account, though revises it in important respects. In developing this account, I also suggest a solution to the problem of how one can act contrary to one’s current better judgment, thereby indicating how this approach can shed new light on traditional debates.


Akrasia Weakness of will Passion Construal Decision theory 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Underwood International CollegeYonsei UniversitySeoulRepublic of Korea

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