Local Economic Development and the Performance of Municipal People’s Congress Deputies in China: an Explanation for Regional Variation

  • Chuanmin ChenEmail author
Research Article


Recent research has revealed the importance of China’s People Congress deputies for authoritarian resilience and explained the historical and individual variations in their behaviors, but the regional variation in the performance of deputies among different local congresses still has not been explored. Based on an original dataset of Municipal People’s Congresses across China, this article illustrates that the variation in the deputy activity of local congresses is mainly caused by the uneven development of the local economy. The results of different statistical models all show that the per capita numbers of deputy proposals of congresses are higher in the regions with larger GDP per capita. The study provides a new explanation for the behaviors of People’s Congress deputies in China and contributes to the research on the performance of subnational authoritarian parliaments.


China’s People’s congress Deputy behavior Local economic development Regional variation Authoritarian institution 



I am grateful for comments and/or assistance by Lianjiang Li, Jing Vivian Zhan, Hok Wui Wong, Junzhi He, Dongya Huang and Zhonghua Guo at various stages of this research. And I also acknowledge the financial support of Sun Yat-sen University Training Scheme for Young Scholars (No. 13000-31610157). All errors remain the author’s own.


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Copyright information

© Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of GovernmentSun Yat-sen UniversityGuangzhouPeople’s Republic of China

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