Determinants of say on pay vote: a configurational analysis

  • Nicola CucariEmail author


This study is the first to employ a relatively new analytical method to investigate combinations of board structure and other corporate characteristics that lead firms to achieve high levels of say on pay voting, based on configurational analysis. In this pioneering manner, using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs-QCA) and the data from 51 listed firms in three different countries (Italy, France and Spain), the results identify four different causal paths that lead to high voting dissent, and two configurational board governance are identified as prototypes of unsatisfactory governance. These configurations, jointly analysing the interactions, allow us to think more carefully about the structure of boards. In particular, the study contributes to theory by identifying how board structure can affect shareholder voting, and by demonstrating the advantages of the configurational approach. Finally, the analysis could assist shareholders in reflecting upon, and justifying their choice to have a specific board structure.


Shareholder activism Voting dissent Say on pay Shareholder voting Bundles of corporate governance Configurational approach QCA 



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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Business Sciences - Management and Innovation SystemsUniversity of SalernoFiscianoItaly

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