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Transparent Coreference

  • François RecanatiEmail author


Because reference is not transparent, coreference is not transparent either: it is possible for the subject to refer to the same individual twice (as in Frege cases) without knowing that the two acts of reference target the same individual. That happens whenever the subject associates two distinct yet coreferential files with two token singular terms. The subject may not know that the two files corefer, so her ascribing contradictory properties to the same object (the referent of the two files) does not threaten her rationality. But if the subject deploys the same file twice, in association with both of the singular terms, she is bound to know that she is referring to the same entity twice (assuming she succeeds in referring).


Frege cases Mental files Anaphora Reference Modes of presentation Cognitive content Sense Coreference de jure 


Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest

The author, François Recanati, declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Research Involving Human and Animal Participants

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College de France (PSL University)ParisFrance

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