pp 1–13 | Cite as

What Could a Two-Way Power Be?

  • Kim FrostEmail author


Alvarez and Steward think the power of agency is a two-way power; Lowe thinks the will is. There is a problem for two-way powers. Either there is a unified description of the manifestation-type of the power, or not. If so, two-way powers are really one-way powers. If not, two-way powers are really combinations of one-way powers. Either way, two-way powers cannot help distinguish free agents from everything else. I argue the problem is best avoided by an Aristotelian view, which posits a distinctive unity of explanation proper to two-way powers, grounded in a distinctive form of reasoning.


Two-way powers Rational powers Power individuation Freedom Forms of explanation Refraining 


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Conflict of interest

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Research Involving Human and Animal Participants

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Hall of Languages 541Syracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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