Theory and Decision

, Volume 85, Issue 3–4, pp 375–387 | Cite as

Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

  • Guy Elaad
  • Artyom JelnovEmail author


We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.


Inspection Cheating Doping Contest 



We would like to thank Yair Tauman, Pradeep Dubey, Yuval Heller, Limor Hatsor, Hanna Halaburda, and Chang Zhao for the helpful comments and discussions.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ariel UniversityArielIsrael

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