## Abstract

We consider domains with a natural property called top-circularity. We show that if such a domain satisfies either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then it is dictatorial. We obtain the result in Sato (Rev Econ Des 14(3):331–342, 2010) as a corollary. Furthermore, it follows from our results that the union of a single-peaked domain and a single-dipped domain (with respect to a given ordering over the alternatives) is dictatorial.

## Keywords

Dictatorial domains Top-circularity Maximal conflict property Weak conflict property## Notes

### Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank an editor, an associate editor, and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. The authors would also like to thank Madhuparna Karmakar, Manipushpak Mitra, Hans Peters, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen, and Ton Storcken for their invaluable suggestions which helped improve this paper. The usual disclaimer holds.

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