Super-Humeanism and free will
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Super-Humeanism is an even more parsimonious ontology than Lewisian standard Humean metaphysics in that it rejects intrinsic properties (local qualties). There are point objects, but all there is to them are their relative positions (distance relations) and the change of them. Everything else supervenes on the Humean mosaic thus conceived. Hence, dynamical parameters (such as mass, charge, energy, a wave-function, etc.) come in on a par with the laws through their position in the best system. The paper sets out how Super-Humeanism has the conceptual means to reject van Inwagen’s consequence argument not by taking the laws to depend on us (as on standard Humean metaphysics), but by taking the initial values of the dynamical parameters that enter into the laws to be dependent on the motions that actually occur in the universe, including the motions of human bodies. The paper spells out the advantages of this proposal.
KeywordsConsequence argument Free will Humean metaphysics David Lewis Super-Humeanism Peter van Inwagen
I would like to thank the organizers and the participants of the workshop “Humeanisms” in Budapest in July 2018 as well as three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on the draft of this paper.
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