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A logic for factive ignorance

  • Ekaterina KubyshkinaEmail author
  • Mattia Petrolo
Knowing the Unknown
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. Knowing the Unknown: Philosophical Perspectives on Ignorance


In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of \(\phi \), then \(\phi \) is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance.


Factive ignorance Agnoiology Epistemic logic Ignorance representation 



The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees of Synthese, Paul Égré, David Gilbert and Giorgio Venturi for useful comments on the material of this paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) through the Project Auxílio à Pesquisa—Jovem Pesquisador No. 2016/25891-3. The work of Ekaterina Kubyshkina is supported by the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), Grant 2018/25501-6. The work of Mattia Petrolo is partly supported by National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) through the project Universal/Faixa A, No. 433781/2018-1.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science (CLE)University of CampinasCampinasBrazil
  2. 2.Center of Natural and Human Sciences (CCNH)Federal University of ABC (UFABC)São Bernardo do CampoBrazil

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