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Synthese

pp 1–21 | Cite as

Lying and knowing

  • Ben HolguínEmail author
Article
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Abstract

This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.

Keywords

Lying Knowing Belief Assertion Gettier cases 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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