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Synthese

pp 1–20 | Cite as

Mistakes as revealing and as manifestations of competence

  • Felipe Morales CarbonellEmail author
Themes from Elgin
  • 32 Downloads
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. True Enough? Themes from Elgin

Abstract

The final chapter of Elgin’s (True enough, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017) defends the claim that some mistakes mark significant epistemic achievements. Here, I extend Elgin’s analysis of the informativeness of mistakes for epistemic policing. I also examine the type of theory of competence that Elgin’s view requires, and suggest some directions in which this can be taken.

Keywords

Understanding Mistakes Informativeness of mistakes Epistemic policies Competence 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by CONICYT’s (Chile) Beca de Doctorado para Estudios en el Extranjero Nr. 72180096. I want to thank my colleagues at KU Leuven, and in particular, I would like to thank Lars Tump and Jan Heylen for their feedback. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of PhilosophyKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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