Advertisement

Synthese

pp 1–22 | Cite as

Social aspects of scientific knowledge

  • Ilkka Niiniluoto
Article

Abstract

From its inception in 1987 social epistemology has been divided into analytic (ASE) and critical (CSE) approaches, represented by Alvin I. Goldman and Steve Fuller, respectively. In this paper, the agendas and some basic ideas of ASE and CSE are compared and assessed by bringing into the discussion also other participants of the debates on the social aspects of scientific knowledge—among them Raimo Tuomela, Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino. The six topics to be analyzed include individual and collective epistemic agents; the notion of scientific community; realism and constructivism; truth-seeking communities; epistemic and social values; science, experts, and democracy.

Keywords

Democracy Epistemic values Experts Scientific community Scientific realism Social epistemology Truth-seeking 

References

  1. Apel, K.-O. (1980). Toward a transformation of philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  2. Ben-David, J. (1971). The scientist’s role in society: A comparative study. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
  3. Campbell, N. (1921). What is science?. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
  4. Cevolani, G. (2014). Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement. Synthese, 191, 2383–2401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Collin, F. (2011). Science studies as naturalized philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Cozzens, S. E., & Woodhouse, E. J. (1995). Science, government, and the politics knowledge. In S. Jasanoff, et al. (Eds.), Handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 533–553). London: Sage.Google Scholar
  7. Diéguez, A. (2011). Kitcher’s modest realism: The reconceptualization of scientific objectivity. Gonzalez, 2011, 141–169.Google Scholar
  8. Douglas, M. (1986). How institutions think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Engelshardt, H. T., Jr., & Caplan, A. L. (Eds.). (1987). Scientific controversies: Case studies in the resolution and closure of disputes in science and technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Feyerabend, P. (1987). Farewell to reason. London: Verso.Google Scholar
  11. Fuller, S. (1988). Social epistemology. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Fuller, S. (1989). Philosophy of science and its discontents. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  13. Fuller, S. (1993). Philosophy, rhetoric, and the end of knowledge: The coming of science and technology studies. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
  14. Fuller, S. (1997). Science. Buckingham: Open University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Fuller, S. (2003). Kuhn vs. Popper: The struggle for the soul of science. Cambridge: Icon Books.Google Scholar
  16. Fuller, S. (2004). Descriptive vs. revisionary social epistemology: The former seen by the latter. Episteme, 1, 23–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Fuller, S. (2008). Dissent over descent: Intelligent design’s challenge to Darwinism. Thriplow: Icon.Google Scholar
  18. Fuller, S. (2012). Social epistemology: A quarter-century itinerary. Social Epistemology, 26, 267–283.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Gibbons, M., et al. (1994). The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies. London: Sage.Google Scholar
  20. Gilbert, M. (1989). On social facts. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  21. Goldman, A. I. (1987). Foundations of social epistemics. Synthese, 73, 109–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Goldman, A. I. (2010). Social epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/enties/epistemology-social/.
  24. Goldman, A. I., & Whitcomb, D. (Eds.). (2011). Social epistemology: Essential readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  25. Gonzalez, W. (Ed.). (2011). Scientific realism and democratic society: The philosophy of Philip Kitcher. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  26. Habermas, J. (1998). On the pragmatics of communication. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  27. Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. (Eds.). (2010). Social epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Hagstrom, W. (1965). The scientific community. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  29. Hegselmann, R., & Krause, U. (2006). Truth and cognitive division of labor: First steps towards a computer aided social epistemology. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9. http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/3/10.html.
  30. Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Kitcher, P. (2001). Science, truth, and democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Kitcher, P. (2002). The third way: Reflections of Helen Longino’s the fate of knowledge. Philosophy of Science, 69, 549–559.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Kitcher, P. (2011). Science in a democratic society. Gonzalez, 2011, 95–112.Google Scholar
  34. Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  35. Kusch, M. (1997). The sociophilosophy of folk psychology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 28, 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Kusch, M. (2011). Social Epistemology. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 873–884). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  37. Kusch, M. (2018). Scientific realism and social epistemology. In J. Saatsi (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of scientific realism (pp. 261–275). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  38. Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  39. Lagerspetz, E. (1989). A conventionalist theory of institutions. Acta Philosophica Fennica 44, Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland.Google Scholar
  40. Lehrer, K., & Wagner, C. (1981). Rational consensus in science and society: A philosophical and mathematical study. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Levi, I. (1967). Gambling with truth: An essay on induction and the aims of science. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
  42. Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  43. Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  44. Longino, H. E. (2002a). The fate of knowledge. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  45. Longino, H. (2002b). Reply to Philip Kitcher. Philosophy of Science, 69, 573–577.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Merton, R. S. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  47. Niiniluoto, I. (1984). Is science progressive?. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Niiniluoto, I. (1993). The aim and structure of applied research. Erkenntnis, 38, 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Niiniluoto, I. (1997). Technology policy in a democratic state. In S. Hellsten, M. Kopperi, & O. Loukola (Eds.), Taking the liberal challenge seriously (pp. 192–204). Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
  51. Niiniluoto, I. (1999). Critical scientific realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  52. Niiniluoto, I. (2003). Science as collective knowledge. In M. Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, & K. Miller (Eds.), Realism in action (pp. 269–278). Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Niiniluoto, I. (2006). World 3: A critical defence. In I. Jarvie, K. Milford, & D. Miller (Eds.), Karl Popper: A centenary assessment iI (pp. 59–69). Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
  54. Niiniluoto, I. (2007). Ethical issues of research and education. In K. Tirri (Ed.), Values and foundations of gifted education (pp. 9–14). Bern: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  55. Niiniluoto, I. (2011). Revising beliefs toward the truth. Erkenntnis, 75, 165–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Niiniluoto, I. (2012). The foundations of statistics: Inference vs. decision. In D. Dieks, et al. (Eds.), Probabilities, laws, and structures (pp. 29–41). Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Niiniluoto, I. (2013). On the philosophy of applied social sciences. In H. Andersen, et al. (Eds.), New challenges to philosophy of science (pp. 265–274). Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Niiniluoto, I. (2014). Values in design sciences. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 46, 11–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Niiniluoto, I. (2016). Science vs. technology: Difference or identity? In M. Franssen, et al. (Eds.), Philosophy of technology after the empirical turn (pp. 93–106). Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  60. Peirce, C. S. (1878a). The fixation of belief. In C. Harsthorne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers (Vol. 5, pp. 1931–1935). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  61. Peirce, C. S. (1878b). The doctrine of chances. In C. Harsthorne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers (Vol. 2, pp. 1931–1935). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  62. Polanyi, M. (1964). Science, faith and society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  63. Polanyi, M. (1967). The tacit dimension. New York: Doubleday, Garden City.Google Scholar
  64. Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  65. Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  66. Quinton, A. (2004). Two kinds of social epistemology. Episteme, 1, 7–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Rolin, K. (2015). Values in science: The case of scientific collaboration. Philosophy of Science, 82, 157–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  68. Roll-Hansen, N. (2017). A historical perspective on the distinction between basic and applied science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48, 535–551.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Rudner, R. (1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science, 20, 1–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
  71. Shapin, S., & Schaffer, S. (1985). Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the experimental life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  72. Shrader-Frechette, K. (1985). Technology assessment, expert disagreement and democratic procedures. In P. Durbin (Ed.), Research in philosophy and technology (pp. 103–129). Greenwich, GT: JAI Press.Google Scholar
  73. Tambolo, L. (2014). Pliability and resistance: Feyerabendian insights into sophisticated realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4, 197–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  74. Tuomela, R. (1984). A theory of social action. Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  75. Tuomela, R. (1995). The importance of us: A philosophical study of basic social notions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  76. van Ditmarch, H., van der Hoek, W., & Kooi, B. (Eds.). (2007). Dynamic epistemic logic. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  77. Way, K. B. (2007). Who has scientific knowledge? Social Epistemology, 21, 335–345.Google Scholar
  78. Ziman, J. (1994). Prometheus bound: Science in a dynamic steady state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, History, and Art StudiesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

Personalised recommendations