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Reliable group belief

  • Jeffrey DunnEmail author
S.I. : Reliability


Many now countenance the idea that certain groups can have beliefs, or at least belief-like states. If groups can have beliefs like these, the question of whether such beliefs are justified immediately arises. Recently, Goldman (in: Lackey (ed) Essays in collective epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) has considered what a reliability-based account of justified group belief might look like. In this paper I consider his account and find it wanting, and so propose a modified reliability-based account of justified group belief. Lackey (Philos Rev 125(3):341–396, 2016) has also criticized Goldman’s proposal, but for very different reasons than I do. Some of her objections, however, can be lodged against the modified account that I propose here. I also respond to these objections. Finally, I note how some formal and experimental work is relevant to those who are attracted to the kind of reliability-based account of justified group belief I develop here.


Reliabilism Justification Group belief Judgment aggregation Alvin Goldman 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentDePauw UniversityGreencastleUSA

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