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How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality

  • Kyle BanickEmail author


Kriegel has revived adverbialism as a theory of consciousness. But recent attacks have shed doubt on the viability of the theory. To save adverbialism, I propose that the adverbialist take a stance on the nature of adverbial modification. On one leading theory, adverbial modification turns on the instantiation by a substance of a psychological type. But the resulting formulation of adverbialism turns out to be a mere notational variant on the relationalist approaches against which Kriegel dialectically situates adverbialism. By contrast, I argue that the way to be an adverbialist is to adopt an event ontology, emphasizing the active contribution of the mind to the phenomenology of experience. My close examination of the semantics of adverbial modification throws this metaphysical distinction into sharp relief. The event-based semantics overcomes recent objections in a way superior to the methods that would have been obviously available in the absence of a sophisticated semantics.


Adverbialism Phenomenal intentionality Consciousness Event semantics Intensional logic 



I would like to thank Sean Walsh, David Woodruff Smith, Annalisa Coliva, Karl Schafer, and Uriah Kriegel for their extensive feedback on earlier versions of this paper. The final version was also importantly shaped by the insightful feedback of several anonymous referees, to whom I am also grateful.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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