Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification
- 16 Downloads
Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification (IEM)? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory.
KeywordsMemory Perception Immunity to error through misidentification
I am very grateful to Kourken Michaelian, and to two anonymous referees for this journal, for their helpful feedback on previous drafts of this paper.
Funding was received by Australian Research Council (Grant No. FT160100313).
- Bernecker, S. (2010). Memory: A philosophical study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Brewer, B. (2007). How to account for illusion. In F. Mcpherson & A. Haddock (Eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge (pp. 168–180). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Burge, T. (1991). Vision and intentional content. In E. LePore & R. Van Gulick (Eds.), John Searle and his critics (pp. 195–214). Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
- Chalmers, D. (2004). The representational character of experience. In B. Leiter (Ed.), The future for philosophy (pp. 153–182). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Debus, D. (2010). Accounting for epistemic relevance. A new problem for the causal theory of memory. American Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 17–29.Google Scholar
- Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Fernández, J. (2018). The functional character of memory. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, & D. Perrin (Eds.), New directions in the philosophy of memory (pp. 52–73). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
- Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
- Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 520–541). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Michaelian, K. (2016). Mental time travel: Episodic memory and our knowledge of the personal past. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and content. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
- Reid, T. (1997). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In D. Brookes (Ed.), University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
- Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-knowledge and self identity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
- Shoemaker, S. (1970). Persons and their pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly, 7, 269–285.Google Scholar
- Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory (pp. 381–403). New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
- Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness: A representational theory of the phenomenal mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar