, Volume 196, Issue 3, pp 1019–1043 | Cite as

Propositions, representation, and truth

  • Geoff GeorgiEmail author


Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory of transparent, non-deflationary truth consistent with some theories of structured propositions, but inconsistent with any theory of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances.


Possible worlds Propositions Fineness of grain Truth 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWest Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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