A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists
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In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been argued that so-called “halfers” can avoid Dutch book arguments by adopting evidential decision theory. I introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall prey to it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The argument crucially requires that an action can provide evidence for what the agent would do not only at other decision points where she has exactly the same information, but also at decision points where she has different but “symmetric” information.
KeywordsSelf-locating beliefs Sleeping Beauty problem Evidential decision theory Dutch books
I thank the anonymous reviewers for many useful comments that have helped to significantly improve the paper.
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