, Volume 192, Issue 9, pp 2887–2899 | Cite as

A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists

  • Vincent ConitzerEmail author


In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been argued that so-called “halfers” can avoid Dutch book arguments by adopting evidential decision theory. I introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall prey to it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The argument crucially requires that an action can provide evidence for what the agent would do not only at other decision points where she has exactly the same information, but also at decision points where she has different but “symmetric” information.


Self-locating beliefs Sleeping Beauty problem  Evidential decision theory Dutch books 



I thank the anonymous reviewers for many useful comments that have helped to significantly improve the paper.


  1. Arntzenius, F. (2002). Reflections on Sleeping Beauty. Analysis, 62(1), 53–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bostrom, N. (2002). Anthropic bias: Observation selection effects in science and philosophy. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  3. Bostrom, N. (2007). Sleeping Beauty and self-location: A hybrid model. Synthese, 157(1), 59–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Briggs, R. (2010). Putting a value on beauty. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 3–34). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Draper, K., & Pust, J. (2008). Diachronic Dutch books and Sleeping Beauty. Synthese, 164(2), 281–287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Elga, A. (2000). Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem. Analysis, 60(2), 143–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Elga, A. (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(2), 383–396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Halpern, J. Y. (2006). Sleeping Beauty reconsidered: Conditioning and reflection in asynchronous systems. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 111–142). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Hitchcock, C. (2004). Beauty and the bets. Synthese, 139(3), 405–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Meacham, C. J. G. (2008). Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs. Philosophical Studies, 138(2), 245–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Pittard, J. (2015). When Beauties disagree: Why halfers should affirm robust perspectivalim. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 5). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Schwarz, W. (2014a). Belief update across fission. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axu001.
  13. Schwarz, W. (2014b). Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver.Google Scholar
  14. Titelbaum, M. G. (2008). The relevance of self-locating beliefs. Philosophical Review, 117(4), 555–605.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Titelbaum, M. G. (2013). Ten reasons to care about the Sleeping Beauty problem. Philosophy Compass, 8(11), 1003–1017.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

Personalised recommendations