, Volume 195, Issue 5, pp 2335–2353 | Cite as

On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics

  • A. R. J. FisherEmail author


David Lewis objected to theories that posit necessary connections between distinct entities and to theories that involve a magical grasping of their primitives. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis objected to nondescript ersatzism on these grounds (and thus branded it as ‘magical’). The literature contains several reconstructions of Lewis’ critique of nondescript ersatzism but none of these interpretations adequately address his main argument because they fail to see that Lewis’ critique is based on broader methodological considerations. I argue that a closer look at his methodology reveals the broader objection he presented against nondescript ersatzism. This objection, I further argue, remains a challenge for the ersatzer who posits structure-less entities as possible worlds.


Lewis Magic Method 



Thanks to Peter Forrest for discussion and Steffi Lewis for permission to publish an excerpt from a letter by David Lewis. I am grateful to the British Academy for a Newton International Fellowship and the John Rylands Research Institute in Manchester, UK for research support.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Social SciencesUniversity of ManchesterManchesterUK

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