Res Publica

pp 1–21 | Cite as

Deliberative Democracy, Diversity, and Restraint

  • James BoettcherEmail author


Public reason liberals disagree about the relationship between public justification and deliberative democracy. My goal is to argue against the recent suggestion that public reason liberals seek a ‘divorce’ from deliberative democracy. Defending this thesis will involve discussing the benefits of deliberation for public justification as well as revisiting public reason’s standard Rawlisan restraint requirement. I criticize Kevin Vallier’s alternative convergence-based principle of restraint and respond to the worry that the standard Rawlsian restraint requirement reduces the likelihood of public justification by limiting the diversity of inputs into the justificatory process.


Public reason Deliberative democracy Public justification Liberalism 



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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint Joseph’s UniversityPhiladelphiaUSA

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