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Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs—Introduction to the Special Issue

  • Stephen MartinEmail author
Article

Abstract

This special issue is occasioned by the 50th anniversary of the publication of Williamson’s (Am Econ Rev 58:18–36, 1968a) seminal analysis of the impact of mergers on market performance. The Introduction reviews Williamson’s work on the topic, and introduces the seven contributions to the special issue. Four are empirical; two are theoretical; and one focuses on policy.

Keywords

Horizontal mergers Merger policy Oliver Williamson 

JEL Classification

L1 L4 K21 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the authors of papers in the special issue and to Larry White for comments on this introduction. Responsibility for errors is my own.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Purdue UniversityWest LafayetteUSA

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