Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?
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Occupational licensing regulations require workers in many different professions to obtain a special permit to work legally in their chosen field. Although professional associations argue that the only goal of professional licensing is to protect the public, occupational regulation may also reduce competition: for example, by reducing entry. This paper reviews the recent literature and policy developments on the subject, with a focus on the European Union.
KeywordsOccupational regulation Professional licensing Labor market regulation Professional markets
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